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Comment 
SHEEHAN V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO:  BALANCING THE OBLIGATION 
OF POLICE OFFICERS AND THE RIGHTS OF 
THE DISABLED 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) with 
the purpose of preventing discrimination against disabled individuals.1  
Even though ADA protections have been applied to areas involving law 
enforcement, it is unclear whether the ADA applies to arrests and the 
question remains a matter of disagreement among the Circuit Courts.2  
The issue at heart is the balance between a disabled person’s right to not 
be discriminated against and police officers’ obligation to protect public 
safety.3  In Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that the ADA applies to arrests and considered 
whether police officers discriminated against Sheehan, a mentally 
disabled patient, by failing to provide reasonable accommodations during 
her arrest.4 
                                                 
1 See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he purpose of the ADA is 
to prevent the discrimination of disabled individuals . . . .”). 
2 See Sheehan v. City and Cty. of San Francisco., 743 F.3d 1211, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(noting that, while some courts have recognized Title II claims in the context of arrests, it 
remains a “matter of some disagreement among [the] circuits” whether police officers have 
to accommodate a person’s disability during an arrest).  See also Hainze, 207 F.3d at 799–800 
(“The broad language of the statute . . . has occasioned the courts’ application of Title II 
protections into areas involving law enforcement.  There is some disagreement, however, 
whether an arrest falls within the ambit of Title II . . . .”); Rachel E. Brodin, Comment, 
Remedying a Particularized Form of Discrimination:  Why Disabled Plaintiffs Can and Should Bring 
Claims for Police Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 
159 (2005) (“The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the applicability of Title 
II to police actions in effecting an arrest, and historically the circuit courts have been split on 
the question.”). 
3 See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1215 (explaining that the fundamental issue is the constitutional 
balance between police efforts to render emergency assistance and an individual’s right to 
be left alone). 
4 Id. at 1217, 1232 (agreeing with the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits that the ADA applies 
to arrests, and concluding that there were triable issues as to whether the police officers failed 
to provide reasonable accommodations for Sheehan’s disability during her arrest).  See 
generally Fourth, CA9:  ADA Applies to Arrests of the Mentally Ill (Noting Circuit Split), 
FOURTHAMENDMENT.COM (Feb. 23, 2014), http://fourthamendment.com/?p=10445 
[https://perma.cc/56XA-YPG5] (summarizing the Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco 
opinion by the Ninth Circuit). 
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This Comment first presents the facts of Sheehan.5  Next, this Comment 
discusses the legal background of the ADA, focusing on its applicability 
to arrests.6  Third, this Comment analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Sheehan, arguing that, even though the court’s holding was correct, the 
court proposed no clear standard for guidance in the future. 7  Finally, this 
Comment proposes a standard for guidance that better balances the 
competing interests of the police force and arrestees with disabilities.8 
II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 7, 2008, Teresa Sheehan, a mentally ill woman, was shot 
five or six times by two police officers from the San Francisco Police 
Department.9  The near fatal shooting ensued after Sheehan’s social 
worker, Heath Hodge, attempted to perform a welfare check on 
Sheehan.10  After Sheehan reacted violently, Hodge completed an 
application for a 72-hour involuntary commitment and then called the 
police department to ask for help in transporting Sheehan to a mental 
facility.11 
When the officers that responded to the call entered Sheehan’s room, 
she approached them with a knife and threatened to kill them. 12  The 
                                                 
5 See infra Part II (stating the pertinent facts of the Sheehan opinion). 
6 See infra Part III (discussing Title II of the ADA). 
7 See infra Part IV.B (examining the language of the ADA and its application to arrests). 
8 See infra Part IV.C (proposing a test for the reasonableness analysis under the ADA in 
the context of arrests). 
9 Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1216–17. 
10 Id. at 1215, 1217.  Sheehan resides at Conrad House, a facility that accommodates 
persons dealing with mental illness.  Id. at 1217.  Hodge was concerned about Sheehan’s 
health because she had been off her medication for months, she was not taking care of herself, 
and her condition was deteriorating.  See id. at 1218 (indicating that Sheehan had been off her 
medication for one and a half years, housemates reported that Sheehan had stopped eating, 
and was wearing the same clothes for several days). 
11 See id. at 1217 (explaining that when Hodge entered Sheehan’s room to perform the 
welfare check on Sheehan, Sheehan told him she had a knife).  After Sheehan’s threat, Hodge 
evacuated the building of other residents, completed the application for Sheehan’s 72-hour 
detention, and called the police nonemergency line to request help transporting Sheehan to 
a mental facility.  Id.  On the 72-hour involuntary detention application, Hodge indicated 
that Sheehan was a danger to others and that she was gravely disabled.  Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 
1218.  However, he did not indicate that she was a danger to herself.  Id.  In addition, Hodge 
gave the police officers no reason to believe that Sheehan was either suicidal or likely to 
injure herself.  Id. 
12 See id. 1218–19 (noting that it is not entirely undisputed what happened when the 
officers entered Sheehan’s room, but that Sheehan conceded to grabbing the knife and 
threatening the officers).  Officer Katherine Holder and Sergeant Kimberly Reynolds were 
the police officers dispatched by the San Francisco Police Department to help Hodge 
transport Sheehan.  Id. at 1217.  Their dispatch information stated:  “Social worker just went 
inside to check on his patient, subject is known to make violent threats, told reporting party 
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officers retreated, but then decided to forcibly re-enter Sheehan’s room.13  
As they re-entered and she approached them with the knife again, the 
officers pepper sprayed her, without effect, and then shot her multiple 
times.14  Sheehan survived the shooting and then filed an action under the 
ADA against the City and County of San Francisco, the Police Chief, and 
both police officers.15  The defendants moved for summary judgment and 
the district court granted their motion.16  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the ADA applies to arrests and that the City was “not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on Sheehan’s ADA claims.”17 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The ADA was signed into law in order to eliminate discrimination 
against disabled individuals.18  Title II of the ADA provides that “no 
                                                 
to get out or she’ll knife him (no weapon seen) . . . .”  Id. at 1217–18.  Hodge informed the 
officers that “he had cleared the building of other residents and that the only way out of 
Sheehan’s room, other than the main door to the second floor hallway, was a second floor 
window that could not be used as a means of egress without a ladder.”  Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 
1218.  Hodge also showed the police officers the involuntary commitment application.  Id. 
13 See id. at 1219 (providing that the officers decided to re-enter because they thought it 
was “necessary to ensure officer safety and to prevent Sheehan from escaping (and becoming 
a threat to others).”).  In fact, after retreating from Sheehan’s room, the officers called for 
back-up and drew their weapons.  Id.  However, the officers decided to re-enter the room 
before backup arrived.  Id. 
14 See id. at 1219–20 (admitting that what happened after the officers re-entered Sheehan’s 
room is subject to dispute, but the officers’ version of the story is that Sheehan approached 
them holding a knife and, after they pepper sprayed her without effect, they fired their 
weapons).  Sheehan’s version of the events differs in that she only took one step toward the 
officers when they entered before they started pepper spaying her and shooting at her.  
Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1220. 
15 See id. (exposing that Sheehan filed an ADA action, among other claims, after a jury 
hung on assault charges and acquitted her on a criminal threat count brought by the city 
after the incident).  Sheehan’s complaint alleged that the officers violated her rights under 
the ADA when they failed to reasonably accommodate her disability when they decided to 
forcibly re-enter her room.  Id. at 1232. 
16 See id. at 1220 (stating that Sheehan timely appealed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants). 
17 Id. at 1232–33.  The court noted that a reasonable jury could find that the officers had 
failed to reasonably accommodate Sheehan’s disability when they decided to forcibly re-
enter her room.  Id. at 1233.  Because the reasonableness of an accommodation is a question 
of fact, the court concluded that district court erred when they granted defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment.  Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1233. 
18 See Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(b)(1):  “Congress enacted the . . . [ADA] with the noble  purpose of ‘provid[ing] a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.’”); Jennifer Fischer, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  
Correcting Discrimination of Persons with Mental Disabilities in the Arrest, Post-Arrest, and 
Pretrial Processes, 23 LAW & INEQ. 157, 159 (2005) (indicating that President George Bush Sr. 
signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990). 
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qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any such entity.”19 
In the context of arrests, courts have recognized two types of claims 
under Title II of the ADA:  (1) wrongful arrest cases; and (2) reasonable 
accommodation cases.20  In the wrongful arrest cases, a plaintiff has a valid 
claim if he was arrested “based on his disability, not for any criminal 
activity.”21  On the other hand, reasonable accommodation cases arise 
when police properly arrest a suspect with a disability, for a crime 
unrelated to that disability, but fail to “reasonably accommodate the 
person’s disability in the course of . . . arrest, causing the person to suffer 
greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.”22  Courts 
have accepted the wrongful arrest theory as establishing a claim under 
Title II of the ADA but, even though failing to reasonably accommodate a 
person’s disability is discriminatory, the Circuit Courts are in 
disagreement on whether a claim can be established under the reasonable 
accommodation theory. 23 
                                                 
19 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).  See generally O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 
1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that, in order to establish a claim of discrimination, a plaintiff 
must prove that:  “(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to 
participate in or receive the benefit of a public entity's services, programs or activities; (3) he 
was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's 
services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; 
and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of her disability”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
20 See Waller ex rel. Hunt v. City of Danville, Va., 556 F.3d 171, 174 (4th Cir. 2009) (asserting 
that courts have recognized two types of claims under the ADA:  (1) wrongful arrest; and (2) 
reasonable accommodation); Brodin, supra note 2, at 161–62 (identifying two theories for 
stating ADA claims arising from an arrest:  (1) the wrongful arrest theory; and (2) the 
reasonable accommodation theory); Fischer, supra note 18, at 181 (classifying decisions in 
arrest, post-arrest, and pretrial ADA cases into three categories:  (1) wrongful arrest cases; 
(2) exigent circumstances cases; and (3) post-arrest and pretrial cases). 
21 Waller ex rel. Hunt, 356 F.3d at 174.  See generally Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 
(10th Cir. 1999) (noting that these claims arise when police wrongfully arrest someone with 
a disability “because they misperceived the effect of that disability as criminal activity”); 
Brodin, supra note 2, at 162 (explaining that arrestees have a claim under the wrongful arrest 
theory when they are arrested for actions taken as a result of their disability). 
22 Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220–21. 
23 See Sheehan v. City and Cty. of San Francisco., 743 F.3d 1211, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(acknowledging the split among the circuits regarding the applicability of the ADA to 
arrests, specifically whether police officers are required to reasonably accommodate for 
disabilities during an arrest).  See generally Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1081–
82 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Title II of the ADA also provides that the Attorney General shall 
promulgate regulations that implement Title II” and explaining that, as a result, the 
Department of Justice promulgated a regulation providing that “a public entity shall make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 [2016], Art. 11
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In Gohier v. Enright, the Tenth Circuit clarified that “a broad 
rule . . . excluding arrests from the scope of Title II . . . is not the law.”24  
Even though the court noted that the facts of the case did not fall into the 
wrongful arrest theory, the court did not discuss the “reasonable-
accommodation-during-arrest theory.”25  A year later, in Hainze v. 
Richards, the Fifth Circuit addressed the question and held that “Title II 
does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported 
disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve 
subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene 
and ensuring that there is no threat to human life.”26  The Sixth Circuit, in 
Tucker v. Tennessee, adopted the exigent circumstances analysis proposed 
by the Fifth Circuit.27  However, in Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, the 
Eleventh Circuit did not address the question whether the ADA applies to 
arrests and declined to adopt the Fifth and Sixth Circuit’s exigent 
circumstances approach.28  Similar to Bircoll, in Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt 
                                                 
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity.”) (internal citations omitted); Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1231 
(“Discrimination includes a failure to reasonably accommodate a person’s disability.”); 
Fischer, supra note 18, at 182 (noting that Congress specifically referred to wrongful arrest as 
the type of discrimination the ADA meant to protect against). 
24 Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221. 
25 See id. at 1221–22 (distinguishing the facts of Gohier from cases applying the wrongful 
arrest theory and expressing no opinion on whether a claim could have been brought under 
the reasonable-accommodation-during-arrest theory).  The court specifically noted that the 
plaintiff failed to make a claim under the reasonable accommodation theory, and thus, it was 
not necessary to rule on the matter.  Id. 
26 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000).  The standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit is regarded 
as an exception to the applicability of the ADA to arrests.  See Waller ex rel. Hunt, 356 F.3d at 
174–75 (explaining that some courts have adopted the exigent circumstances exception to 
absolve police officers from the duty to provide reasonable accommodations during an 
arrest); David A. Maas, Expecting the Unreasonable:  Why a Specific Request Requirement for ADA 
Title II Discrimination Claims Fails to Protect Those Who Cannot Request Reasonable 
Accommodations, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 221 (2011) (identifying the exigent 
circumstances and public-safety exceptions to the ADA’s anti-discrimination commands). 
27 See 539 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Where . . . officers are presented with exigent or 
unexpected circumstances, it would be unreasonable to require certain accommodations be 
made in light of the overriding public safety concerns.”)  However, the court concluded that 
the ADA applies to post-arrest procedures.  Id. at 537. 
28 See 480 F.3d at 1084–85 (declining to enter the circuits’ debate on the applicability of the 
ADA to arrests and declining to adopt the exigent circumstances test outlined by the Fifth 
Circuit in Hainze).  The court further noted that “[t]he exigent circumstances presented by 
criminal activity and the already onerous tasks of police on the scene go more to the 
reasonableness of the requested ADA modification than whether the ADA applies in the first 
instance.”  Id.  The court explained that “the question is whether, given criminal activity and 
safety concerns, any modification of police procedures is reasonable before the police 
physically arrest a criminal suspect, secure the scene, and ensure that there is no threat to the 
public or officer’s safety.”  Id. 
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v. City of Danville, the Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the exigent 
circumstances approach.29  In addition, the court went on to analyze a 
claim for failure to reasonably accommodate during an arrest.30  Finally, 
in Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Title II of the ADA applies to arrests.31 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco Decision 
In an unanimous decision, the Ninth Circuit held that Title II of the 
ADA applies to arrests.32  Judge Fisher, writing for the court, began by 
noting the circuit split on the subject and provided a brief explanation of 
the different views regarding the applicability of the ADA to arrests 
among the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.33  Following, Judge 
Fisher stated that the court was in agreement with the majority of circuits 
in that the ADA applies to arrests.34  In support of this conclusion, Justice 
Fisher noted that the ADA applies to “police ‘services, programs, or 
activities,’” and explained that the court has interpreted the terms 
services, programs, and activities to cover “anything a public entity 
does.”35  Nonetheless, Judge Fisher went on to indicate that “exigent 
circumstances inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA . . . .”36 
                                                 
29 See 556 F.3d at 175 (refusing to decide whether and when the exigent circumstances test 
applies in ADA claims).  Nonetheless, the court noted that “[r]easonableness in law is 
generally assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, and exigency is one 
circumstance that bears materially on the inquiry into reasonableness under the ADA.”  Id. 
30 See id. at 174–75 (considering whether police officers failed to reasonably accommodate 
the plaintiff during a two hour standoff).  The court concluded that the duty to reasonably 
accommodate was satisfied because the accommodations the plaintiff proposed were 
unreasonable considering the unstable circumstances the officers faced.  Id. at 176–77. 
31 See Sheehan v. City and Cty. of San Francisco., 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating 
that even though the Ninth Circuit does not adopt the Eleventh and Fifth Circuit’s exigent 
circumstances analysis to exempt police officers from having to reasonably accommodate 
during an arrest, the court indicated, “exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness 
analysis”). 
32 See id. at 1217 (concluding that police officers have to reasonably accommodate during 
arrests).  Judge Graber wrote a dissenting opinion, but she concurred with the court’s 
decision regarding the applicability of ADA to arrests.  Id. at 1234–36. 
33 See id. at 1232–33 (discussing the different views among the circuits regarding the 
applicability of the ADA to arrests).  See generally supra Part III (summarizing the circuit split). 
34 See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (holding that the ADA applies to arrests and exigent 
circumstances inform the reasonableness of an accommodation). 
35 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
36 Id. 
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B. Appraisal of the Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco Decision 
The court in Sheehan reached the correct result when it held that Title 
II of the ADA applies to arrests because the language of the ADA supports 
such a conclusion and public policy considerations weigh in favor of such 
a holding.  The language of the ADA, as interpreted by the courts, 
supports the conclusion that Title II of the ADA extends to areas of law 
enforcement, such as arrests.37  Title II of the ADA protects “qualified 
individual[s] with a disability.”38  A qualified individual with a disability 
is defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable modifications . . . or the provision of auxiliary aids and 
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipts of 
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public 
entity.”39  The Supreme Court instructed that the words “eligibility” and 
“participation” in the preceding definition do not require voluntariness 
on the part of the person seeking the protections of the ADA.40  Since 
voluntariness is not required to meet the eligibility requirements entitling 
an individual to the receipt of services or participation in programs 
provided by a public entity, the definition of a qualified individual with a 
disability does not exclude suspected criminals.41  Accordingly, the 
protections established by Title II of the ADA extend to disabled 
arrestees.42 
Furthermore, under the ADA, a public entity includes “any 
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a 
State or States or local government[.]”43  This is interpreted to include 
“every possible agency of state or local government,” such as law 
                                                 
37 See generally Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The broad language 
of the statute and the absence of any stated exceptions has occasioned the courts’ application 
of Title II protections into areas involving law enforcement.”). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). 
39 Id. § 12131(2). 
40 See Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1081 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pa. Dep’t 
of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998), where the Supreme Court held that disabled 
prisoners can bring claims under the ADA if denied participation in activities provided by 
the prison). 
41 See Brodin, supra note 2, at 170–72 (examining the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeskey, 
holding that the definition of a qualified individual with a disability included prisoners and 
suspected criminals). 
42 See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court’s broad reading of Title II of the ADA 
allowed Yeskey to open the door for lower courts to apply the ADA to police officers’ actions). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). 
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enforcement agencies. 44  Thus, police departments are public entities.45  
Lastly, the ADA’s broad language has been construed as “bring[ing] 
within its scope ‘anything a public entity does.’”46  Therefore, the phrase 
“services, programs, or activities” in § 12132 of Title II and the words 
“programs” and “activities” in the definition of a “qualified individual 
with a disability” encompass arrests.47  Accordingly, the language of the 
ADA supports the conclusion that Title II applies to arrests because 
disabled arrestees are qualified individuals and arrests are a service, 
program, or activity performed by a public entity—police departments.48 
In considering public policy, the interests of the police force and the 
rights of arrestees with disabilities have to be balanced.  In favor of 
holding that the ADA applies to arrests are studies suggesting that 
persons with mental disabilities are more likely to be arrested and cases 
showing that police officers have often injured or killed people with 
mental disabilities when attempting to apprehend them.49  However, 
holding that the ADA applies to arrests could unduly burden police 
officers’ jobs.50  During arrests, officers are often acting under time 
constraints that require on-the-spot decisions and thus, holding that the 
ADA applies to arrests could potentially interfere with an officers’ 
decision making and jeopardize their ability to act on time. 51  Therefore, 
                                                 
44 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Armstrong v. 
Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) and citing Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912–13 
(8th Cir. 1998)). 
45 See id. (providing that the ADA applies to law enforcement agencies). 
46 Id. (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998)). 
47 Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2008). 
48 See generally supra Part IV.B (dissecting § 12132 to determine whether the ADA applies 
to arrests). 
49 See Brodin, supra note 2, at 160 n.23 (“In medium and large cities nationwide, police 
departments estimate that an average of approximately seven percent of police calls involve 
mentally ill people.”); Fischer, supra note 18, at 165–66 (“One study shows that 42–50% of 
persons with a mental illness will be arrested at some point in their lives, compared with 
another study that indicated only 7–8% of the general population will have contact with the 
police.  Other studies show that persons with a mental illness are more likely to be arrested 
than the general population.”).  See also Brodin, supra note 2, at 158 (“There are a number of 
cases in which police officers, in attempts to apprehend people with mental disabilities, have 
injured or killed them, even when the victim’s family or friend originally summoned the 
officers to provide assistance.”). 
50 See Maas, supra note 26, at 220–21 (examining the burden placed on law enforcement by 
the ADA’s requirement to provide reasonable accommodations).  If the ADA applies to 
arrests, there is an additional burden placed on law enforcement to train police officers to 
comply with ADA mandates.  See id. at 222–23  (examining the challenges of training law 
enforcement to comply with the duty to provide accommodations, and highlighting the 
difficulties presented by the number of police interactions and the vast array of disabilities). 
51 See, e.g., Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[F]orestalling all police 
activity until an interpreter can be located to aid communication with the deaf protagonist 
would be impractical and could jeopardize the police’s ability to act in time to stop a fleeing 
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requiring officers to consider whether their actions during an arrest 
conform to the ADA could hinder “their ability to perform their duties,” 
and risk public safety.52  Specifically, in the context of reasonable 
accommodation cases during arrests, officers’ ability to perform their 
duties would be hindered because they “would be second-guessed for 
pursuing one [accommodation] over the other, on grounds that there was 
always something more or different that could have been done.”53 
Nonetheless, officers’ interests are already protected under the ADA 
by statutory language indicating that there is no ADA violation if “the 
public entity can show that the accommodation requested . . . would 
‘result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or 
activity’ or ‘undue financial and administrative burdens.’”54  Furthermore, 
taking into consideration exigent circumstances under the reasonableness 
analysis further protects the officers’ interests.55  Since concerns related to 
public safety and officers’ abilities to perform their duties are addressed 
in the reasonableness of an accommodation analysis, the ADA has to 
apply to arrests in order to protect the rights of arrestees with disabilities.56 
C. Consequences of the Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco 
Decision 
Even though the court in Sheehan reached the correct result when it 
held that Title II of the ADA applies to arrests, the court failed to indicate 
what factors should be considered in the reasonableness analysis under 
the ADA.  As a result, lower courts have no standard for guidance.  
Accordingly, this comment proposes a factors test akin to the 
reasonableness analysis under Fourth Amendment claims.57 
                                                 
suspect . . . .”); Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Law enforcement 
personnel conducting in-the-field investigations already face the onerous task of frequently 
having to instantaneously identify, assess, and react to potentially life-threatening 
situations.”). 
52 See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (“To require the officers to factor in whether their actions are 
going to comply with the ADA . . . would pose an unnecessary risk to innocents.”); Tucker, 
539 F.3d at 536 (“Imposing a stringent requirement under the ADA is inconsistent with [the] 
expectation [that law enforcement officers respond fluidly to changing situations and 
individuals they encounter], and impedes their ability to perform their duties.”); Waller ex 
rel. Hunt v. City of Danville, Va., 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Requiring officers to 
consider ADA compliance . . . would risk public safety.”). 
53 Waller ex rel. Hunt, 556 F.3d at 176. 
54 Tucker, 539 F.3d at 533 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35.164). 
55 Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232. 
56 See supra Part IV.B (balancing the burden placed on police officers by the ADA’s 
mandate to reasonably accommodate during arrests and the interests of disabled arrestees). 
57 See Brodin, supra note 2, at 184 (noting that, even though ADA claims do not implicate 
constitutional principles, Congress passed the ADA in order to enforce the constitutional 
right of equal protection).  Thus, the proposed analysis should be similar because 
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In determining whether there was a failure to reasonably 
accommodate during an arrest, the proposed test balances two factors, 
each composed of subfactors.58  First, courts should examine the 
circumstances surrounding the arrest, taking into consideration (1) the 
nature and severity of the crime; (2) the time constraints; and (3) the 
location.59  Under the nature and severity of the crime subfactor, courts 
should evaluate the risk of serious harm to the public, the officers, and the 
arrestee.60  When considering the time constraints subfactor, courts should 
evaluate whether time is of the essence for officers to properly carryout 
their duties.61  Finally, under the location factor, courts should consider 
                                                 
countervailing governmental interests come into play when considering the reasonableness 
of an accommodation.  See generally id. at 179 (examining the balancing test employed in 
Fourth Amendment claims, which balances “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”). 
58 See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The question whether a 
particular accommodation is reasonable . . . requires a fact-specific, individualized analysis 
of the disabled individual’s circumstances and the accommodations that might allow him to 
meet the program’s standards.”). 
59 See supra Part IV (proposing a test for determining the reasonableness of an 
accommodation provided during an arrest that balances two factors:  the circumstances 
surrounding the arrest and the appropriateness of the officer’s attempt at reasonably 
accommodating the individual). 
60 See, e.g., Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1086 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that in 
DUI stops the danger to human life is high and thus, it was not reasonable to accommodate 
a deaf arrestee).  Under this subfactor, it would be informative to consider whether there is 
a violent hostage situation and what is the likelihood that a confrontation will ensue.  See, 
e.g., Waller ex rel. Hunt v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
a “reasonable belief on the part of officers that this was a potentially violent hostage 
situation” informs the ADA inquiry).  See also Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1087 (determining what 
reasonable accommodations are necessary for a deaf arrestee depends on the “nature of the 
criminal activity involved and the importance, complexity, context, and duration of the 
police communication at issue”).  Courts should also assess the arrestee’s behavior, 
considering whether he is armed, resisting arrest or evading arrest, and if he is suicidal.  See, 
e.g., Waller ex rel. Hunt, 556 F.3d at 175 (“Although the officers did not face an immediate 
crisis, the situation was nonetheless unstable:  officers could not see or speak to Evans, Hunt 
implied that he had weapons, and Hunt was growing more and more agitated.”). 
61 See Waller ex rel. Hunt, 556 F.3d at 175 (“Just as the constraints of time figure in what is 
required of police under the Fourth Amendment, they bear on what is reasonable under the 
ADA.”).  See also Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1086 (explaining that is was not reasonable to 
accommodate the deaf arrestee because time was of the essence); Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 
F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the circumstances did not permit taking the time to 
reasonably accommodate deaf arrestees).  Under this subfactor, it would be informative to 
consider whether the situation has been diffused or contained, whether the scene is secured, 
whether there is risk of flight, and whether there is an immediate need to subdue the arrestee.  
See generally Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (indicating that the safety 
of the arrestee, the officers, and nearby civilians is an important consideration). 
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whether the arrest is taking place at a public location or the person’s 
home.62 
Second, courts should assess the appropriateness of the officer’s 
attempt at reasonably accommodating the individual, taking into 
consideration (1) whether there was a good faith effort to accommodate; 
and (2) the burden of accommodating.63  When evaluating the good faith 
subfactor, courts must question whether the accommodations provided 
were reasonably calculated to be effective.64  Furthermore, courts should 
explore what accommodations could have been effective, and if there 
were multiple accommodations available, officers have “the ultimate 
discretion to choose between effective accommodations, and may choose 
the less expensive accommodation or the accommodation that is easier for 
[them] to provide.” 65  Finally, under the burden of the accommodation 
subfactor, courts should analyze whether accommodating a person’s 
disability during arrest would “fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity” or “impose an undue burden.”66  Thus, 
officers are not required to employ “any and all” accommodations 
available, but only those that would be reasonable considering the totality 
of the factors.67 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1086 (“Forestalling all police activity at a roadside DUI stop 
until an oral interpreter arrives is . . . impractical . . . .”). 
63 See, e.g., Tucker, 539 F.3d at 537 (agreeing with the district court’s determination that 
there was a good faith effort to accommodate). 
64 See, e.g., id. (noting that the jail made a good faith effort to accommodate deaf arrestees 
in a manner that was effective).  The court should keep in mind that the “duty to 
accommodate is a continuing duty that is not exhausted by one effort.”  U.S. EEOC v. UPS 
Supply Chain Sols., 620 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
65 UPS Supply Chain Sols., 620 F.3d at 1111.  See, e.g., Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1087 (noting that 
“whether another effective, but non-burdensome, method of communication exists” is 
important in determining whether a requested accommodation was reasonable).  Under this 
subfactor, it would be informative to consider whether commonly used accommodations 
were employed, such as using the passage of time to diffuse the situation, speaking with a 
supervisor or someone familiar with the arrestee’s disability; calling for backup; giving the 
arrestee time and space to calm down; using non-threatening communication; and any other 
less confrontational tactics.  See, e.g., Waller ex rel. Hunt, 556 F.3d at 176–77 (reasoning that 
the duty of reasonable accommodation was satisfied because the officers spoke with their 
supervisor and with persons close to the situation and attempted to calm the situation by 
waiting before entering the apartment). 
66 Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1082. 
67 Id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the ADA in order to prevent discrimination against 
disabled individuals.68  Even though some courts have held that ADA 
protections extend to arrests, the subject is a “matter of disagreement 
among [the] Circuits.”69  In Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the ADA applies to arrests.70  The court’s holding 
was correct because the language of the ADA and public policy 
considerations support such a conclusion.71  However, the court failed to 
provide a standard for guidance when analyzing the reasonableness of an 
accommodation under the ADA in the context of arrests.72  Accordingly, 
this Comment proposed a factors test that provides a standard for 
guidance.73  Under the test, courts balance two factors:  the circumstances 
surrounding the arrest and the appropriateness of the officer’s attempt at 
reasonably accommodating the arrestee.74  The test is not all-inclusive, but 
it provides an ample standard for guidance that balances the interests of 
the police force and the rights of arrestees with disabilities. 
Manuela Cabal Carmona* 
                                                 
68 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (indicating that Congress sought to prevent 
discrimination of disabled individuals when it enacted the ADA). 
69 Sheehan v. City and Cty. of San Francisco., 743 F.3d 1211, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that it remains a “matter of some disagreement among [the] circuits” whether 
police officers have to accommodate a person’s disability during an arrest). 
70 Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232. 
71 See supra Part IV.B (examining the language of the ADA and its applicability to arrests). 
72 See supra Part IV.C (noting that the only guidance provided by the Ninth Circuit was 
that exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness of an accommodation). 
73 See supra Part IV.C (proposing that a court determining the reasonableness of an 
accommodation provided during an arrest should consider two factors:  the circumstances 
surrounding the arrest and the appropriateness of the officer’s attempt at reasonably 
accommodating the individual). 
74 See supra Part IV.C (recommending that under the first factor courts consider (1) the 
nature and severity of the crime; (2) the time constraints; and (3) the location, and that, under 
the second factor, courts determine (1) whether there was a good faith effort to 
accommodate; and (2) the burden of accommodating). 
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